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Case and Comment

C.L.J.

inappropriate invocation of Convention and Community law.
Moreover, following earlier cases like R. v. Cambridge Health
Authority, ex p. B. [1995] 1 W.L.R. 898, it reaffirms that, subject to
the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts, the discretion to allocate
resources lies with health authorities, and it provides those
authorities with some useful guidance. The case is, however, an
unusual example of a successful challenge to the exercise of that
discretion, reflecting a greater, and welcome, judicial willingness to
scrutinise than has been evident in cases such as R. v. Central
Birmingham Health Authority, ex p. Collier (1988, unreported),
where the court declined even to seek the authority's reasons why a
life-saving heart operation on a baby had been postponed several
times.
Not least in view of the inexorably rising demands on limited
resources, the courts are likely to face a growing number of difficult
questions about resource allocation. What if the authority in this
case had argued, supported by a body of medical opinion, that
transsexualism is a mental illness but one for which the only
appropriate treatment is psychotherapy to bring the mental illness
into line with the physical reality rather than surgery to bring the
physical reality into line with the mental illness? What if an authority
declines to fund gender reassignment, and/or heart transplants, and/
or drugs for HIV, so as to increase expenditure on health education
and/or chiropody and/or health visitors? What procedures, if any,
would it be unreasonable to fund? What about the (recently
reported) amputation of healthy limbs as a treatment for "body
dysmorphic disorder"? Would this procedure pass the criminal law
test of "reasonable surgical interference"?
The wide room for disagreement surrounding questions of
resource allocation makes it all the more likely that patients will be
tempted to seek their resolution judicially. The courts ain't seen
nothin' yet.
JOHN KEOWN

BETWEEN THE BABY AND THE BREAST

IN Re C (A CHILD)

(HIV Test) [1999] 2 F.L.R. 1004, a local
authority applied for a specific issue order to test a four-month-old
baby girl for HIV. The mother of the child first tested positive for
HIV in 1990, but adopted a highly sceptical stance towards
generally accepted theories about HIV and AIDS, and refused
conventional therapy for herself, preferring to rely on a healthy
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lifestyle as a prophylactic. The case arose when the baby's
physician became aware not only that the mother was breastfeeding the child (despite the risk of transmission of HIV), but that
the parents refused even to have their daughter tested for the virus
in the belief that a healthy lifestyle was the optimal treatment even
if she were HIV-positive.
In answering the question whether the court could or should
require a course of treatment for a child which was in accordance
with conventional medical practice, but which was opposed by the
parents, the court adopted the conventional view about the
transmission and treatment of HIV. In addition, the court noted the
parents' unequivocal testimony that they would not alter their care
of their baby no matter what the test results showed.
Despite these facts, Wilson J. in the Family Division refused to
do more than order the single HIV test requested by the local
authority, expressing a perhaps over-optimistic belief that disclosure
of the baby's true status would inspire the parents to embrace
conventional medicine. Admittedly, there was little else the court
could do, since its ability to impose a treatment plan different from
the plans suggested by the parties is severely limited: Re S and D
(Children: Powers of Court) [1995] 2 F.L.R. 456, 463-464
(Balcombe L.J.). The Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal:
[1999] 2 F.L.R. 1017.
However, and more problematically, Wilson J. did not stop with
the single order at issue. He strongly suggested that if the child
tested positive for HIV and went into decline, the court would
order conventional drug therapy if the parents did not initiate such
treatment voluntarily. He was less inclined to propose prophylactic
drug therapy, but expressly left the issue open for later debate.
These conclusions appear proper. However, a problem would arise
if the child were to test negative for HIV. In that event, the court
would in all likelihood not order the mother to cease breast-feeding,
since Wilson J. stated that if she "cannot be persuaded by rational
argument that she must curb her instinct to feed, I doubt she
would comply with a court order" to do so. The Court of Appeal
accepted Wilson J.'s position regarding breast-feeding, noting that a
prohibitory order "would be ineffective".
Although these statements are technically obiter, it is absurd to
suggest that the court may act to prolong an infected child's life
but not to save him or her from contracting HIV in the first place.
In making his order, Wilson J. recognised that the Children Act
1989 required the court to give paramount consideration to the
baby's welfare and cited two cases in support of his decision. In Re
T (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1997] 1 All E.R. 906,
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the Court of Appeal refused to order a child to return from a
Commonwealth country and undergo a liver transplant in England
that would, in all likelihood, save his life, focusing largely on the
mother's refusal of consent. The mother's wishes were persuasive
because there was room for disagreement as to what was in the
best interest of the child. Wilson J. also cited Re B (A Minor)
(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421, in which the
Court of Appeal overruled parental wishes and required a Down's
syndrome baby to have a life-saving operation to remove an
intestinal blockage. The court in Re T distinguished Re B on the
grounds that the Down's syndrome baby needed only a single
operation, whereas the child in Re T would have needed long-term
care after the liver transplant.
The highly individualistic analysis required under the Children
Act 1989's welfare principle means that earlier cases cannot be
considered as binding precedents, but they are persuasive.
Therefore, to the extent that Re C is about a single blood test, it is
analogous to Re B rather than Re T Even if Re C is interpreted as
dealing with a child requiring long-term care, however, Wilson J.
did not adopt the approach used in Re T This result suggests either
that he believed the long-term burden of care to be less than the
burden in Re T or that C's parents had not demonstrated that there
was room for disagreement about what was in the best interest of
the child. However, neither of these grounds explains his view of
the position should the baby be found to be HIV-negative. To
support his conclusion on this point, Wilson J. referred to the
mother's "instinct to feed". However, such language is patently out
of place when the parents have undertaken a long-standing,
considered course of treatment. It is not "instinct" that is at issue;
it is the parents' belief about conventional medicine, the same belief
that the court was prepared to overrule in the event that the child
tested positive for HIV.
Although one cannot draw direct comparisons between the
criminal and civil law, there are times when it is, or should be,
appropriate to analogise. For example, the court in Re C should,
perhaps, have taken into account the fact that parental beliefs
about medical treatment cannot be used as a defence to charges of
child neglect or harm. In R. v. Senior [1899] 1 Q.B. 283, a father
was convicted of manslaughter for refusing to provide his child
with medical treatment. There, as in Re C, the father believed that
his method of care (prayer) was superior to conventional medicine.
Although the father acted out of religious scruples, the court
looked only at whether he had refrained from taking "such steps as
a reasonable parent would take, such as are usually taken in the
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ordinary experience of mankind". Although the "reasonable parent"
standard was rejected in Re T, R. v. Senior still illustrates the "clear
case" for judicial intervention identified by Waite L.J. in Re T, and
adopted by Wilson J. in Re C, wherein "parental opposition to
medical intervention is prompted by scruple or dogma of a kind
which is patently irreconcilable with principles of child health and
welfare widely accepted by the generality of mankind".
Although the parents in Re C were not claiming to act out of
religious belief, they did argue that their beliefs about the nature and
treatment of HIV and AIDS should prevail. However, if religious
beliefs (which are greatly respected in law and society) cannot negate
a charge of manslaughter, why should controversial beliefs about
medical treatment be allowed to prevail here? Must one wait until the
child dies to demonstrate that the parents' beliefs were not sufficient
as a matter of law to justify their actions? Surely not.
A more recent case, R. v. Sheppard [1981] A.C. 394, construes
Senior as not creating an absolute offence. Instead, the question is
whether the parent's "failure to provide medical care is due to
inability, through stupidity or ignorance, to appreciate the need for
it". "[A] parent who knows that his child needs medical care and
deliberately, that is by conscious decision, refrains from calling a
doctor, is guilty" of neglect.
Were the parents in Re C acting improperly under Sheppard?
They knew of the possible need for medical care, since they had
researched conventional medical practices extensively. One could
say that they had "wilfully shut [their] eyes to the need for medical
care", not only with respect to the need for an HIV test but with
respect to continued breast-feeding as well.
Not every principle of criminal law is transferable to the civil
law. However, when courts contemplate the possibility of the future
death of a child due to the beliefs of the parents, they should at
least consider analogous criminal cases. Both Senior and Sheppard
provide useful information about what types of parental beliefs can
and "cannot stand against the right of the child to be properly
cared for in every sense", to quote Butler-Sloss L.J. in Re C. Belief
patterns that are "patently irreconcilable with principles of child
health and welfare" cannot be allowed to prevail under either the
criminal or civil law, particularly when such beliefs are overruled in
one instance (such as when a child is HIV-positive) but not in
another (such as when a child is HIV-negative). In suggesting that
"the law cannot come between the baby and the breast", Wilson J.
effectively conceded the law's inability to protect this child in the
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event that she was HIV-negative, a concession that need not and
should not have been made.
S.I. STRONG

A DUTY TO GIVE REASONS?

Flannery v. Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd. [2000] 1 W.L.R. 377,
the purchasers of a flat in Manchester sued a valuer, on whose
report they had relied, for negligence. At the trial there was a
conflict of expert evidence. The judge preferred the evidence of the
defendant's experts and dismissed the claim. It was accepted that
the judge's conclusion was one that was open to him on the
evidence. The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment and ordered
a new trial.
The trouble, according to Henry L.J., giving the judgment of the
court, was that the trial judge had not given his reasons for
preferring the defendant's evidence. All he had said on that was
that he had heard the witnesses and seen the way in which they
reacted to the questions they were asked; this was not enough to
satisfy his duty to give reasons. It was by now too late to call upon
the judge to reconstitute his reasons and there were no transcripts
of the experts' oral evidence. A new trial was necessary.
In the past, the reasons given by judges for their decisions were
often short and unhelpful. Goodhart, in his famous essay on the
ratio decidendi of a case, clearly contemplated that a case might be
a precedent even if no reasons at all were given (Essays in
Jurisprudence and the Common Law (Cambridge 1931), p. 1, at
p. 6). Things are different now, and Henry L.J. thought it clear that
"today's professional judge owes a general duty to give reasons",
but the case on which he principally relied (R. v. Crown Ct., ex p.
International Club [1982] 2 Q.B. 304) was an application for judicial
review of a decision of the Crown Court on appeal from a licensing
committee, and reasons have been required of licensing justices
since at least 1892: R. v. Thomas [1892] 1 Q.B. 426 (mandamus).
Flannery, on the other hand, was an ordinary civil appeal, and in
such cases the appeal is "by way of rehearing", which means that it
is not restricted to questions of law alone: in principle, an appellate
court makes its own finding of facts.
It has, of course, frequently been stressed that appellate judges,
when considering questions of fact, must bear in mind that the trial
judge does, and they do not, have the advantage of seeing and
hearing the witnesses. This is rarely of importance, however, in
IN

